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Abstract
The mathematical formalism of quantum theory exhibits significant effectiveness when applied to cogni-
tive phenomena that have resisted traditional (set theoretical) modeling. Relying on a decade of research
on the operational foundations of micro-physical and conceptual entities, we present a theoretical frame-
work for the representation of concepts and their conjunctions and disjunctions that uses the quantum
formalism. This framework provides a unified solution to the ‘conceptual combinations problem’ of
cognitive psychology, explaining the observed deviations from classical (Boolean, fuzzy set and Kol-
mogorovian) structures in terms of genuine quantum effects. In particular, natural concepts ‘interfere’
when they combine to form more complex conceptual entities, and they also exhibit a ‘quantum-type
context-dependence’, which are responsible of the ‘over- and under-extension’ that are systematically
observed in experiments on membership judgments.
Keywords: Cognitive psychology, concept combination, context effects, interference effects, quantum
modeling, quantum structures
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1 Introduction
Philosophers and psychologists have always been interested in the deep nature of human concepts, how they
are formed, how they combine to create more complex conceptual structures, as expressed by sentences and
texts, and how meaning is created in these processes. Unveiling aspects of these mysteries is bound to have
a massive impact on a variety of domains, from knowledge representation to natural language processing,
machine learning and artificial intelligence.
The original idea of a concept as a ‘container of objects’, called ‘instantiations’, which can be traced back
to Aristotle, was challenged by the first cognitive tests by Eleanor Rosch, which revealed that concepts
exhibit aspects, like ‘context-dependence’, ‘vagueness’ and ‘graded typicality’, that prevent a too na¨ıve
definition of a concept as a ‘set of defining properties that are either possessed or not possessed by individual
exemplars’ [1, 2]. More, these tests infused the suspicion that concepts do not combine by following the
algebraic rules of classical logic. A first attempt to preserve a set theoretical modeling came from the ‘fuzzy
set approach’: concepts would be represented by fuzzy sets, while their conjunction (disjunction) satisfies
the ‘minimum (maximum) rule of fuzzy set conjunction (disjunction)’ [3]. However, also this approach
was confuted by a whole set of experiments by cognitive psychologists, including Osherson and Smith,
who identified the ‘Guppy effect’ (or ‘Pet-Fish problem’) in typicality judgments [4], James Hampton, who
discovered ‘overextension’ and ‘underextension’ effects in membership judgments [5, 6], and Alxatib and
Pelletier, who detected ‘borderline contradictions’ in simple propositions of the form “John is tall and
John is not tall” [7]. More recently, some of us proved that these data violate Kolmogorov’s axioms of
classical probability theory [8], thus revealing that classical structures,1 like Boolean and fuzzy set logic
and Kolmogorovian probability, are intrinsically unable to model the way in which concepts combine [9, 10]
(Sect. 2).
Interestingly, the deviations from classicality observed in typicality and membership judgments were also
identified in other domains of cognitive psychology, and are known as ‘fallacies of human reasoning’, which
include conjunctive and disjunctive fallacies, disjunction effects, question order effects, violations of utility
theory, etc. [11]. Moreover, in the last decade a novel research programme has taken off, which successfully
applies the mathematical formalism of quantum theory (and its possible natural generalizations) to model
these fallacies of human reasoning (see, e.g., [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]). Even more interestingly,
quantum micro-physical entities (like electrons, protons, atoms, etc.) and conceptual entities do exhibit
a very similar behavior with respect to ‘potentiality’ and ‘context-dependence’, that is, in both micro-
physical and conceptual realms a context is able to change the state of the entity under study, thus
actualizing potential properties, rather than just unveiling existing, though unknown, values of them [17].
Taking inspiration from our investigations on the operational and realistic approaches to the foundations
of quantum physics (see, e.g., [18, 19]), we aim to present in this paper a quantum theoretical framework
to represent the conjunction and disjunction of two natural concepts. To this end, we firstly provide an
operational-realistic foundation of a theory of concepts, which are defined as ‘entities in context-dependent
states’, rather than mere ‘containers of instantiations’ (Sect. 3). Secondly, we observe that this operational-
realistic foundation is compatible with the operational-realistic foundation that justifies the use of the
Hilbert space formalism to represent the micro-physical entities, which suggests that the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory in Hilbert space is a possible (and in a sense natural) candidate to represent
conceptual entities too.
After a brief review of the essentials of the quantum formalism that are needed to understand our
results (Sec. 4), we then introduce the quantum theoretical representation of the conjunction and the
1In this paper, we refer to set theoretical structures as ‘classical structures’, because they were originally used to repre-
sent systems and interactions in classical physics, and later were extended to psychology, economics, statistics, finance, etc.
Analogously, we refer to deviations from set theoretical modeling as ‘deviations from classicality’.
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disjunction of two natural concepts (Sect. 5). In it, deviations from classicality are explained as due to
genuine quantum aspects, namely, ‘context-dependence’, ‘emergence’, ‘interference’ and ‘superposition’.
The approach also explains how new conceptual structures can emerge when concepts combine. We also
show that the quantum theoretical framework is powerful enough to model any type of effect that can be
detected in concrete experiments, which, by way of example, we do explicitly with some of Hampton’s data
for the conjunction and the disjunction of two natural concepts.
We conclude by emphasizing that the quantum theoretical modeling is not ‘ad hoc’, in the sense that
it does not arise from a mere modeling of data, but rather it results from the foundational hypothesis that
quantum theory (and its possible natural extensions) provides a unified and possibly universal paradigm
to represent conceptual entities and their meaning-driven interactions (Sect. 6).
2 The combination problem
That concepts exhibit aspects of ‘context-dependence’, ‘vagueness’ and ‘graded typicality’ was already
known in the seventies since the investigations of Eleanor Rosch [1, 2]. Her studies challenged the traditional
view that concepts are containers of instantiations, together with the implicit assumption that conceptual
combinations follow the set theoretical algebraic rules of classical logic. In particular, conceptual gradeness
suggested a fuzzy set representation of concepts: for each item X, a concept A is associated with a graded
membership µ(A), while the conjunction ‘A and B’, respectively the disjunction ‘A or B’, of the concepts
A and B, should satisfy the ‘minimum rule of fuzzy set conjunction’ µ(A and B) = min [µ(A), µ(B)],
respectively the ‘maximum rule of fuzzy set disjunction’ µ(A or B) = max [µ(A), µ(B)] [3].
In this way, one could still maintain that ‘concepts can be represented as (fuzzy) sets and combine
according to set theoretical rules’. However, a whole set of experimental findings revealed that the latter
does not hold, even if the combinations are simple conjunctions or disjunctions of two concepts. This raised
the so-called ‘combination problem’, that is, how the combination of two concepts should be expressed in
terms of the component concepts.
The first obstacle came from the studies of Osherson and Smith. They observed that, for an item like
Guppy, people rate its typicality with respect to the conjunction Pet-Fish higher than its typicality with
respect to Pet or Fish, taken separately. This is the so-called ‘Guppy effect’ (or ‘Pet-Fish problem’) [4].
Thus, the Guppy effect violates the minimum rule of fuzzy set conjunction.
But, the most impressive violation of classicality in concept combination came from the experimental
studies of psychologist James Hampton, in the late eighties. In a first experiment, Hampton tested the
‘membership weight’ of various sets of items, e.g., Cuckoo, Peacock, Toucan, Parrot, Raven, etc., with
respect to pairs of natural concepts, e.g., Bird and Pet, taken individually, and their conjunction Bird and
Pet [5]. In a second experiment, Hampton tested the membership weight of various sets of items, e.g.,
Apple, Broccoli, Tomato, Mushrooms, Almonds, etc., with respect to pairs of natural concepts, e.g., Fruits
and Vegetables, again taken individually, and their disjunction Fruits or Vegetables [6]. More explicitly,
participants were asked to rate, for each item X, its membership with respect to the concepts A, B and
their conjunction ‘A and B’, or disjunction ‘A or B’ (depending on the pair of concepts considered).
Membership was estimated on a 7-point Likert scale, {+3,+2,+1, 0,−1,−2,−3}, where the choice +3
meant that the item was estimated a ‘very strong member of the concept’, the choice −3 meant that the
item was estimated a ‘very strong non-member of the concept’, and the choice 0 meant that the participant
had not preference of membership or non-membership of the concept. Membership estimations were then
converted into relative frequencies and, in the large number limit, into ‘normalized membership weights’.
Hampton identified systematic deviations from the minimum rule of fuzzy set conjunction, as well as
systematic deviations from the maximum rule of fuzzy set disjunction. Adopting his terminology, if the
membership weight of an item X with respect to the conjunction ‘A and B’ of two concepts A and B
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is higher than the membership weight of X with respect to one concept (both concepts), we say that X
is ‘overextended’ (‘double overextended’) with respect to the conjunction. Similarly, if the membership
weight of an item X with respect to the disjunction ‘A or B’ of two concepts A and B is less than the
membership weight of X with respect to one concept (both concepts), we say that X is ‘underextended’
(‘double underextended’) with respect to the disjunction.
Further experiments confirmed and deepened the findings above. Hampton found overextension in the
conjunction ‘A and not B’, where ‘not B’ denotes the negation of the natural concept B [20]. Alxatib and
Pelletier identified ‘borderline contradictions’ in sentences involving ‘A and not A’ [7], and some of us also
detected overextension and double overextension by simultaneously testing conceptual conjunctions of the
form ‘A and not B’, ‘not A and B’ and ‘not A and not B’ [21, 22].
In these latter works, it emerged that the observed deviations from classicality are deeper than initially
expected, as they depend on the fact that set theoretical structures are too limited to represent conceptual
combinations. Indeed, let us consider the membership weights of items with respect to concepts and their
conjunctions/disjunctions measured by Hampton [5, 6]. In [9, 10], we proved that a large part of Hampton’s
data on conjunctions of two concepts cannot be modeled in a single probability space satisfying the axioms
of Kolmogorov [8]. For example, the item Mint scored in [5] the membership weight µ(A) = 0.87, with
respect to the concept Food, µ(B) = 0.81, with respect to the concept Plant, and µ(A and B) = 0.9,
with respect to their conjunction Food and Plant. Hence, the item Mint exhibits a ‘double overextension’
with respect to the conjunction Food and Plant of the concepts Food and Plant, and no Kolmogorovian
probability representation exists for these data. More generally, the membership weights µ(A), µ(B) and
µ(A and B) of the item X with respect to concepts A, B and their conjunction ‘A and B’, respectively,
can be represented in a single Kolmogorovian probability space if and only if they satisfy the following
inequalities [9]:
µ(A and B)−min [µ(A), µ(B)] ≤ 0 µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A and B) ≤ 1 (1)
A violation of the first inequality in (1) entails, in particular, that the minimum rule of fuzzy set conjunction
does not hold, as in the case of Mint.
Similarly, in [9, 10] it was proved that a large part of Hampton’s data on disjunctions of two concepts
cannot be modeled in a single Kolmogorovian probability space. For example, the item Sunglasses scored in
[6] the membership weight µ(A) = 0.4 with respect to the concept Sportswear, µ(B) = 0.2 with respect to
the concept Sports Equipment, and µ(A or B) = 0.1 with respect to their disjunction Sportswear or Sports
Equipment. Thus, the item Sunglasses exhibits ‘double underextension’ with respect to the disjunction
Sportswear or Sports Equipment of the concepts Sportswear and Sports Equipment, and no Kolmogorovian
probability representation exists for these data. More generally, the membership weights µ(A), µ(B) and
µ(A or B) of the item X with respect to concepts A, B and their disjunction ‘A or B’, respectively, can be
represented in a single Kolmogorovian probability space if and only if they satisfy the following inequalities
[9]:
max[µ(A), µ(B)] − µ(A or B) ≤ 0 0 ≤ µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A or B) (2)
A violation of the first inequality in (2) entails, in particular, that the maximum rule of fuzzy set disjunction
does not hold, as in the case of Sunglasses.
The difficulties above reveal that the formation and combination rules of human concepts do not obey
the restrictions of classical (fuzzy set) logic and Kolmogorovian probability theory. Hence, the combination
problem needs to be approached with a novel and more general research programme.
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3 An operational-realistic foundation
The investigations of the quantum mechanical representability of concepts by our group in Brussels can
be traced back to our previous studies on the axiomatic and operational foundations of quantum physics,
the differences between classical and quantum structures and the origins of quantum probability (see, e.g.,
[19]). We recognized that any decision process, e.g., a typicality measurement, or a membership estimation,
involves a ‘transition from potential to actual’, in which an outcome is actualized within a set of possible
outcomes, as a consequence of a contextual interaction (of a cognitive nature) between the decision-maker
and the conceptual situation that is the object of the decision. Thus, human decision processes exhibit
a deep analogy with what occurs in a quantum measurement process, where the measurement context
(of a physical nature) influences the measured quantum particle in a non-deterministic way, actualizing
properties that were only potential prior to the measurement. Different form ‘classical probability’, which
can only deal with situations of lack of knowledge about actuality, ‘quantum probability’ is able to formalize
such ‘contextually driven actualization of potential’. Thus, it can cope with the intrinsic uncertainty
underlying both quantum and conceptual realms [17, 23, 24].
These preliminary analogies led us to systematically inquire into the most plausible mathematical
structures formalizing both the micro-physical and conceptual entities. In this respect, the formalism
of quantum theory, based on complex Hilbert spaces, has always amazed researchers for its impressive
effectiveness and predictive power. This inspired a fruitful investigation of the foundations of quantum
theory in Hilbert space from physically justified axioms, resting on well defined empirical notions, more
directly connected with the operations that are usually performed in a laboratory. Such an operational
justification would indeed make the formalism of quantum theory more firmly founded.
A in Geneva and Brussels developed approach to the foundations of quantum physics is the ‘State
Context Property’ (SCoP), in which any physical entity is expressed in terms of the basic notions of ‘state’,
‘context’ and ‘property’, which arise as a consequence of concrete physical operations on macroscopic
apparatuses, like preparations and registrations, performed in spatio-temporal domains, like physical lab-
oratories [19]. State transformations, measurements, outcomes, and probabilities can then be expressed in
terms of these basic notions. If suitable axioms are imposed on the mathematical structures underlying the
SCoP formalism, then the Hilbert space structure of quantum theory emerges as a unique mathematical
representation, up to isomorphisms [18].2
This line of research inspired the operational approaches applying the quantum formalism outside the
microscopic domain of quantum physics [17, 23, 24]. In particular, a very similar realistic and operational
description can be given for the conceptual entities of the cognitive domain, in the sense that the SCoP
formalism can be employed to also formalize conceptual entities in terms of states, contexts, properties,
measurements and probabilities of outcomes [16].
Let us consider the empirical phenomenology of cognitive psychology. Like in physics, where labo-
ratories define spatio-temporal domains, we can introduce ‘psychological laboratories’, where cognitive
experiments are performed. These experiments are performed on situations that are specifically ‘prepared’
for the experiments, including experimental devices and, for example, structured questionnaires, human
participants that interact with the questionnaires in written answers, or with each other, e.g., an interviewer
and an interviewed. Whenever empirical data are collected from the responses of several participants, a
statistics of the obtained outcomes arises. Starting from these empirical facts, we can identify in our
approach entities, states, contexts, measurements, outcomes and probabilities of outcomes, as follows.
The complex of experimental procedures conceived by the experimenter, the experimental design and
setting and the cognitive effect that one wants to analyze, define a conceptual entity A, and are usually
2Interestingly, the approach allowed to put into evidence an important shortcoming of the standard quantum formalism:
the impossibility of describing experimentally separated entities [19].
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associated with a preparation procedure of a specific state of A. Hence, like in physics, the preparation
procedure sets the initial state pA of the conceptual entity A under study. Let us consider, for example,
a questionnaire where a participant is asked to rank on a 7-point Likert scale the membership of a list
of items with respect to the concepts Fruits, Vegetables and their conjunction Fruits and Vegetables. The
questionnaire defines the states pFruits, pV egetables and pFruits and V egetables of the conceptual entities Fruits,
Vegetables and Fruits and Vegetables, respectively. Although in some cognitive situations the preparation
procedure of a conceptual entity is hardly controllable, the state of the conceptual entity, defined by means
of such a preparation procedure, can always be considered to be a ‘state of affairs’. It indeed expresses
a ‘reality of the conceptual entity’, in the sense that, once prepared in a given state, such condition is
independent of any measurement procedure, and can be equally confronted with the different participants
in an experiment, leading to outcome data and their statistics, exactly like in physics.3
A context e is an aspect of the experiment that can provoke a change of state of the conceptual entity.
For example, the concept Juicy can act as a context for the conceptual entity Fruits, leading to combined
concept Juicy Fruits, which can then be also interpreted as a state of the conceptual entity Fruits, and more
precisely the state describing the situation where ‘the fruit is juicy’. A particular type of context is the one
introduced by the measurement itself. Indeed, when the cognitive experiment starts, an interaction of a
cognitive nature occurs between the conceptual entity A under study and a participant in the experiment,
in which the state pA of the conceptual entity A generally changes, being transformed into another state
p. This cognitive interaction is also formalized by means of a context e. For example, if the participant is
asked to choose among a list of items, say, Olive, Almond, Apple, etc., the most typical one with respect
to Fruits, and the answer is Apple, then the initial state pFruits of the conceptual entity Fruits changes to
pApple, i.e. to the state describing the situation ‘the fruit is an apple’, as a consequence of the contextual
interaction with the participant.
Thus, the change of the state of a conceptual entity due to a context may be either ‘deterministic’, hence
in principle predictable under the assumption that the initial state is known, or ‘intrinsically probabilistic’,
in the sense that only the probability µ(p, e, pA) that the state pA of A changes to the state p is given.
In the example above on typicality estimations, the typicality of the item Apple for the concept Fruits is
formalized by means of the transition probability µ(pApple, e, pFruits), where the context e is the context of
the typicality measurement. More generally, suppose that the membership of an item X is estimated by a
given sample of participants, with respect to a concept A. The item X acts as a context eX that changes the
state pA of the conceptual entity A into a new state pX . The decision measurement can then be described as
a further context e that changes the state pX into a new state p. Hence, the membership weight µ(A) can be
expressed as the product of the transition probabilities µ(A) = µ(pX , eX , pA)µ(p, e, pX) = µ(p, e, pX), where
the last equality follows from the fact that the change pA → pX is deterministic, so that µ(pX , eX , pA) = 1.
We have thus described an approach in which, similarly to the operational-realistic foundation of
micro-physical entities, a concept can be understood not a container of instantiations, but as an entity in a
well-defined state, which can change under the effects of deterministic and indeterministic contexts. This
suggests that the Hilbert-based formalism of quantum theory could be a proper candidate to also represent
concepts and their interactions.
4 Essentials of quantum mathematics
We present in this section some basic definitions and results of the mathematical formalism of quantum the-
ory that are needed when the quantum formalism is applied to represent concepts and their combinations.
3A difference between psychological and physics laboratories is that in the former each participant works as a distinct
measuring apparatus, usually producing a single outcome, whereas in the latter a same apparatus is usually used to produce
multiple outcomes; see the discussion in [25].
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We will be rigorous, without however dwelling on technical details.
When the quantum mechanical formalism is applied for modeling purposes, each considered entity – in
our case a concept – is associated with a complex Hilbert space H, that is, a vector space over the field C of
complex numbers, equipped with an inner product 〈·|·〉 that maps two vectors 〈A| and |B〉 onto a complex
number 〈A|B〉. We denote vectors by using the bra-ket notation introduced by Paul Adrien Dirac, one of
the pioneers of quantum theory [27]. Vectors can be ‘kets’, denoted by |A〉, |B〉, or ‘bras’, denoted by 〈A|,
〈B|. The inner product between the ket vectors |A〉 and |B〉, or the bra-vectors 〈A| and 〈B|, is realized by
juxtaposing the bra vector 〈A| and the ket vector |B〉, and 〈A|B〉 is also called a ‘bra-ket’, and it satisfies
the following properties:
(i) 〈A|A〉 ≥ 0;
(ii) 〈A|B〉 = 〈B|A〉∗, where 〈B|A〉∗ is the complex conjugate of 〈B|A〉;
(iii) 〈A|(z|B〉 + t|C〉) = z〈A|B〉 + t〈A|C〉, for z, t ∈ C, where the sum vector z|B〉 + t|C〉 is called a
‘superposition’ of vectors |B〉 and |C〉 in the quantum jargon.
From (ii) and (iii) follows that the inner product 〈·|·〉 is linear in the ket and anti-linear in the bra, i.e.
(z〈A|+ t〈B|)|C〉 = z∗〈A|C〉+ t∗〈B|C〉.
The ‘absolute value’ of a complex number is defined as the square root of the product of this complex
number times its complex conjugate, that is, |z| = √z∗z. Moreover, a A complex number z can either be
decomposed into its Cartesian form z = x+ iy, or into its polar form z = |z|eiθ = |z|(cos θ+ i sin θ), where
|z| denotes the ‘absolute value’ of z. Hence, one has |〈A|B〉| =
√
〈A|B〉〈B|A〉. We define the ‘length’ of a
ket vector |A〉 as |||A〉|| = √〈A|A〉. A vector of unitary length is called a ‘unit vector’. We say that the
ket vectors |A〉 and |B〉 are ‘orthogonal’, and write |A〉 ⊥ |B〉, if 〈A|B〉 = 0.
We have now introduced the necessary mathematics to state the first modeling rule of quantum theory.
First quantum modeling rule. A state of an entity modeled by quantum theory (in our case a concept) is
represented by a unit vector |A〉, that is, 〈A|A〉 = 1.
We also need to introduce the notion of an orthogonal projection operator M , which is a linear operator on
the Hilbert space, that is, a mapping M : H → H, |A〉 7→M |A〉, having the properties of being Hermitian
and idempotent. This means that, for every |A〉, |B〉 ∈ H and z, t ∈ C, we have:
(i) M(z|A〉 + t|B〉) = zM |A〉 + tM |B〉 (linearity)
(ii) 〈A|M |B〉 = 〈B|M |A〉∗ (hermiticity)
(iii) M2 =M (idempotency)
The identity operator 1 maps each vector onto itself and is a trivial orthogonal projection operator. We
say that two orthogonal projection operators Mk and Ml are orthogonal operators if each vector contained
in the range Mk(H) is orthogonal to each vector contained in the range Ml(H), and we write Mk ⊥ Ml,
in this case. The orthogonality of the projection operators Mk and Ml can equivalently be expressed as
MkMl = 0, where 0 is the null operator. A set of orthogonal projection operators {Mk | k = 1, . . . , n} is
called a ‘spectral family’ if all projectors are mutually orthogonal, that is, Mk ⊥ Ml for k 6= l, and their
sum is the identity operator, that is,
∑n
k=1Mk = 1.
We are now in a position to state the second and third modeling rules of quantum theory.
Second quantum modeling rule. A measurable quantity Q of an entity modeled by quantum theory (in our
case a concept), having a set of possible real values {qk | k = 1, . . . , n}, is represented by a spectral family
{Mk | k = 1, . . . , n} in the following way. If the entity is in a state represented by the unit vector |A〉, then
the probability of obtaining the value qk, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, in a measurement of the measurable quantity Q,
is
µA(qk) = 〈A|Mk|A〉 = ||Mk|A〉||2 (3)
This formula for probabilistic assignment is called the ‘Born rule’ in the quantum jargon.
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Third quantum modeling rule. If the value qk, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is actually obtained in the measurement of a
measurable quantity Q on an entity modeled by quantum theory (in our case a concept), when the entity
is in an initial state represented by the unit vector |A〉, then the initial state is changed into an outcome
state represented by the vector
|Ak〉 = Mk|A〉||Mk|A〉|| =
Mk|A〉√
〈A|Mk|A〉
(4)
This change of state is called ‘collapse’, or ‘reduction’, in the quantum jargon.
The quantum modeling above can be generalized in different ways, by introducing rules to model
composite entities, or weakening the rules above to represent more complex situations.4 However, what we
have here presented is sufficient for attaining our results in the next sections.
5 Effects of interference and context
The quantum theoretical framework for conceptual combinations is obtained by canonically representing
the operational notions of state and state changes, (membership and typicality) measurements and (de-
terministic and indeterministic) contexts, introduced in Sect. 2, by means of the specific Hilbert space
mathematics of the quantum formalism, as summarized in Sect. 4. We limit ourselves here to specifying
the quantum theoretical framework for the conjunction and the disjunction of two concepts [9, 10, 26].
Let us start with the disjunction of two concepts. Consider, for example, the item Olive, whose
membership was estimated in [6] with respect to the concepts Fruits, Vegetables and their disjunction
Fruits or Vegetables. We make three quantum theoretical hypotheses:
(i) Whenever Fruits and Vegetables combine, they superpose and interfere. As a consequence of this
superposition and interference, a new concept Fruits or Vegetables emerges.5
(ii) Whenever the item Olive is considered, a context effect (specific to the item considered) occurs,
which produces a deterministic change of state of the conceptual entities Fruits, Vegetables and Fruits
or Vegetables. This context effect is different than the one created when a different item, say Apple, is
considered, again with respect to Fruits, Vegetables and Fruits or Vegetables.
(iii) The decision of a participant who estimates the membership of Olive with respect to Fruits,
Vegetables and Fruits or Vegetables is considered as a measurement with two outcomes, ‘yes’ and ‘no’, on
the conceptual entities Fruits, Vegetables and Fruits or Vegetables, respectively.
Coming to the representation, let A and B be two concepts and let the membership of the item X be
estimated with respect to A, B and their disjunction ‘A or B’. Concepts are operationally described as
entities in specific states, thus we represent the states of the concepts A and B by the unit vectors |A〉 and
|B〉, respectively, of a Hilbert space H, whereas the state of the concept ‘A or B’ is represented by the
normalized superposition |A or B〉 = 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉). For the sake of simplicity, we assume in the following
that |A〉 and |B〉 are orthogonal, that is, 〈A|B〉 = 0.
To describe the context effect produced by the specific item X, we use an orthogonal projection operator
N , over the Hilbert space H. (We can understand N as projecting onto the subspace of states that are also
states of the concept X). When applied to the unit vectors |A〉 and |B〉 and 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉), the operator N
produces the new non-unit vectors N |A〉 and N |B〉 and N |A or B〉 = 1√
2
(N |A〉+N |B〉). The transformed
states of the concepts A, B and ‘A or B’, resulting from the context effect related to the item X, are then
4For instance, more general rules of probabilistic assignment than the Born one seem to be necessary for a complete
modeling of question order effects data [25].
5This is similar to the prototypical example of the two-slit experiment, where a genuine interference pattern emerges when
both slits are open, which cannot be explained in a compositional way, i.e., by assuming that the quantum entities (for example,
photons) always pass through one or the other slit.
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represented by the unit vectors |AN 〉, |BN 〉 and |(A or B)N 〉, respectively, obtained by normalizing the
projected vectors N |A〉, N |B〉 and N |A or B〉, respectively. More precisely, using (4), we get
|AN 〉 = N |A〉||N |A〉|| , |BN 〉 =
N |B〉
||N |B〉|| , |(A or B)N 〉 =
1√
2
(N |A〉 +N |B〉)
|| 1√
2
(N |A〉 +N |B〉)|| . (5)
Let us now come to the representation of the decision measurement of a person estimating whether the
item X is a member of the concepts A, B and ‘A or B’. This corresponds to a measurable quantity with two
values, ‘yes’ and ‘no’, and is represented by the spectral family {M,1−M}, withM an orthogonal projection
operator over H. By using the Born rule (3), the probabilities µ(A), µ(B) and µ(A or B) thatX is estimated
as a member of the concepts A, B and ‘A or B’, respectively, i.e., its membership weights, are given by the
inner products µ(A) = 〈AN |M |AN 〉, µ(B) = 〈BN |M |BN 〉 and µ(A or B) = 〈(A or B)N |M |(A or B)N 〉.
By using (3) and (5), we thus obtain
µ(A) =
〈A|NMN |A〉
〈A|N |A〉 , µ(B) =
〈B|NMN |B〉
〈B|N |B〉 (6)
µ(A or B) =
(〈A|+ 〈B|)NMN(|A〉 + |B〉)
(〈A| + 〈B|)N(|A〉+ |B〉)
=
〈A|NMN |A〉 + 〈B|NMN |B〉+ 2ℜ〈A|NMN |B〉
〈A|N |A〉 + 〈B|N |B〉+ 2ℜ〈A|N |B〉 (7)
The real parts ℜ〈A|NMN |B〉 and ℜ〈A|N |B〉 are the typical ‘interference terms’ of quantum theory.
We now assume that the context effect consisting of considering the item X and the decision measure-
ment consisting of choosing in favor or against membership of item X are ‘compatible’. This is a natural
assumption, as both contexts are generated by the same item X, and is formalized in quantum theory by
requiring the commutativity of the corresponding orthogonal projection operators, that is, MN = NM .
This entails that NMN =MNN =MN , hence
µ(A or B) =
〈A|MN |A〉 + 〈B|MN |B〉+ 2ℜ〈A|MN |B〉
〈A|N |A〉 + 〈B|N |B〉+ 2ℜ〈A|N |B〉 (8)
Using some simple algebra and trigonometry, one can show that (8) reduces to the following expression
[26]:
µ(A or B) =
n2µ(A) + n′2µ(B) + 2nn′
√
µ(A)µ(B) cosφd
n2 + n′2 + 2nn′ cosφd(
√
µ(A)µ(B)−√(1− µ(A))(1 − µ(B)) (9)
where φd is the ‘interference angle for the disjunction’, and n, n
′ and R are real parameters such that
R =
√
(1− µ(A))(1 − µ(B))−
√
µ(A)µ(B),
√
(1− n2)(1− n′2) = nn′|R| (10)
One shows that (9) provides a solution for any type of effect that can be experimentally detected,
namely, classical data satisfying (2), overextension and underextension. In addition, one shows that the
simplest Hilbert space able to do so is the three-dimensional complex Hilbert space C3, with a suitable choice
of the orthogonal projection operators M and N [26]. For example, consider the item Refrigerator with
respect to the pair of concepts House Furnishings and Furniture, and their disjunction House Furnishings
or Furniture. Hampton found µ(A) = 0.9, µ(B) = 0.7 and µ(A or B) = 0.575, which means that we
are in the situation of ‘double underextension’ [6]. Equations (9)–(10) can be solved for R = −0.6205,
n = 0.7331, n′ = 0.8312 and φd = 119.3535◦ . The concepts House Furnishings and Furniture are instead
represented by the unit vectors |A〉 = (0.6955, 0.2318, 0.6801), |B〉 = ei119.3535◦(0.6955,−0.4553,−0.5559),
in the canonical base {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} of C3 [26].
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Coming now to the conjunction of two concepts, the same modeling can be used, mutatis mutandis,
with the conjunction ‘A and B’ still represented by a normalized superposition |A and B〉 = 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉),
with the previous ‘interference angle for the disjunction’ φd now replaced in (9) by an ‘interference angle
for the conjunction’ φc.
Again, one shows that (9) provides a solution for any type of effect that can be experimentally detected,
namely, classical data satisfying (1), overextension and underextension, with the simplest Hilbert space
being again C3 [26]. For example, consider the item TV with respect to the pair of concepts Furniture
and Household Appliances, and their conjunction Furniture and Household Appliances. Hampton found
µ(A) = 0.7, µ(B) = 0.9, and µ(A and B) = 0.925, which means that we are in the situation of ‘double
overextension’ [5]. Equations (9)–(10) can be solved for R = −0.6205, n = 0.5370, n′ = 0.9301 and
φc = 66.79
◦. The concepts Furniture and Household Appliances are instead represented by the unit vectors
|A〉 = (0.45, 0.29, 0.84), |B〉 = ei66.79◦(0.88,−0.29,−0.37), always in the canonical base of C3 [26].
This completes the construction of a quantum modeling for the conjunction and the disjunction of two
concepts. It shows how new conceptual structures emerge from the component concepts without any need
for logical connections between the latter, and explains deviations from classicality in terms of genuine
quantum effects, such us context-dependence, interference and superposition.
6 Conclusions
We have presented here a quantum theoretical framework to represent natural concepts and their conjunc-
tions and disjunctions. We have shown that such framework can capture genuine quantum aspects, namely,
context-dependence, emergence, interference and superposition, and that these aspects are responsible of
the deviations from classical logical and probabilistic structures that are observed in membership judg-
ments on conceptual combinations [5, 6, 7, 20, 21, 22]. Hence, the quantum framework provides a solution
of the combination problem and constitutes a faithful model for diverse sets of experimental data.
It is however important to stress that the quantum models arising from the present approach are
not ‘ad hoc’, in the sense that they are not devised to merely fit empirical data. They rather emerge
from a ‘theory based approach’, which looks for the most plausible mathematical structures to represent
both micro-physical and conceptual realms [19, 25]. Indeed, are the deep analogies between the physical
and conceptual domains, in the description of measurement processes, that led us to inquire into the
realistic-operational foundations of conceptual entities and their description in terms of states, contexts,
measurements, outcomes and probabilities, suggesting that quantum structures are very plausible and
natural structures to represent both domains. As such, the quantum models are subject to the technical
and epistemological constraints of quantum theory, here meant as a possibly universal, coherent and unified
theoretical scheme to represent conceptual entities and their interactions.
To conclude, the quantum theoretical framework can be naturally extended to represent more complex
conceptual combinations, like conceptual negation and combinations of several concepts. This extension
enables the identification of further quantum aspects in conceptual combinations, e.g., ‘entanglement’ and
‘quantum-type indistinguishability’, together with identification of new non-classical patterns of violation,
which go beyond over- and under-extension, but capture deep aspects of concept formation [21, 22] and
context effects [25]. However, the presentation of these results would go beyond the scopes and length
limits of the present paper.
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